



























Many Western countries with an aging population consider reforms of their pay-as-you-go 
pension systems. In Sweden a new pension system has already been decided and 
implemented. This paper gives a brief background to the Swedish reforms in the 1990s and 
explains the structure of the new system. 
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1. Three kinds of pensions 
 
1.1 Social security pensions 
 
In 1947 Parliament decided on a flat rate basic pension that was not means-tested. 1960 an 
earnings related supplementary pension followed. After a referendum voters opted in favour 
of a PAYGO system and against a funded DC system. It was in the interest of the social 
democrats and the workers union to get a PAYGO system that could give workers a pension 
relatively quickly without having to wait for funds to accumulate. Although some white collar 
groups already had occupational pensions, many voted in favour of a PAYGO system because 
all prewar birth cohorts would benefit from the suggested PAYGO system. They would 
contribute less than they got out. 
 
In the supplementary pension system, called the ATP system, benefits were given at a 
replacement rate of 60 per cent of the average annual earnings of the fifteen best years up to a 
ceiling. To get a full pension 30 years of qualifying earnings were required. Earnings as well 
as benefits were indexed by the CPI. Contributions were paid based on all earnings, also 
earnings above the ceiling. For ordinary wage earners these contributions were paid by the 
employers. Already from the start of the ATP system relatively large buffer funds were built 
up. They were larger than motivated just by their function as buffer funds. The ATP system 
thus included an element of forced savings to compensate for an expected drop in private 
savings when the new pension system was introduced. They have primarily been used to 
finance public housing programs, and deficits in the government sector while a smaller share 
was channelled back as loans to the firms that contributed to the system. 
 
1.2 Negotiated group (occupational) pensions 
 
About 80 per cent of the Swedish work force is covered by negotiated group pensions. They 
have been negotiated between unions and employers. They do not only cover union members 
but usually also non-members within the same ”occupations”. There are four major contracts: 
One for blue collar workers in private industry, on for white collar workers in private 
industry, one for government employees and one for employees of local governments. Until 
the most recent pension reforms in the 1990s all contracts were of the defined benefit type. 
The pensions in the private sector were funded while the pensions in the public sector were 
not. These negotiated group pensions typically increased the compensation rate for an average 
worker by about 10 percentage points. They included stipulations of an upper retirement age, 
usually the age of 65. 
 
1.3 Private pension policies 
 
It has been possible to sign up for a private pension policy with an insurance company during 
the whole post war period and enjoy a postponement of income tax within certain limits. 
However, relatively few wage earners did. It was an instrument primarily for people who 
were not well covered by social security and group pensions and for relatively wealthy 
people. Not until the discussion about the viability of the social security system started in the 





1.4 The relative importance of the three pension sources 
 
Table 1 gives the relative importance of various income sources by the age of household head 
for all Swedish households in 1992 and 1999. In 1992 the share of social security pensions of 
all incomes was about 75 percent for those who were 70 or older and 67 percent in the age 
group 65-69. In 1999 this share had decreased to about 65 and 55 percent respectively while 
the relative importance of group insurance doubled from 6-8 per cent in 1992 to 12-16 per 
cent in 1999. The share of private insurance increased too. It was highest among the young 
pensioners and contributed 3 per cent in 1992 and 5 in 1999 for those in the age group 65-69. 
It is also interesting to note that the share of capital income, that is a close substitute to 
incomes from private pensions, increased their share from 9-11 per cent to 14-15 per cent for 
the age groups above 65. 
 
The major explanation to the decreasing share of the public pensions is that an increasing 
share of the wage earners have passed the ceiling of the system and earn maximum benefits, 
while there is no such ceiling in the group pensions. The increased share of private pensions is 
explained by increased savings and an exceptional return on financial assets in the 1990s. 
 
2.  Why a reform? 
 
The combination of increased early retirement, increasing longevity, low economic growth 
and the large cohorts of the 1940s made the public system financially unstable.  
 
Table 2 shows five years average labor force participation rates by hours of work, age and 
gender for the period 1976-2000. These numbers illustrate the drop in male participation that 
was particularly strong in the age group 60-64, and the initial increase and then drop in female 
participation. At the end of the 1990s less than 50 percent of 64 years old males worked and 
less than 40 percent of 64 years old females. Thus about half the work force had left the labor 
market before ”normal” retirement age! Figure 1 shows from which sources those who have 
left the labor force draw incomes. There are several routs out of the labor force. Two major 
routs are through unemployment and other labor market policy related benefits, and through 
sickness and rehabilitation benefits. Disability pension is another but smaller route. Not until 
people approach 60 early use of old age pensions becomes a major source of income, in 
particular the negotiated group pensions.  
 
In 1960 the remaining life expectancy after the age of 60 was 19.3 years for Swedish females 
and 17.3 years fore males. In 1998 these numbers had increased to 24.2 and 20.2 years 
respectively. 
 
Like in most other Western countries these changes combined with the large birth cohorts of 
the 1940s will in the next ten years increase the dependency ratio. In 1999 there were 2.1 
gainfully employed for every old age and early retired, and in 2030 this ratio is predicted to 
decrease to 1.5. 
 
Computations presented in Social Insurance in Sweden 2000 pages 20 and 27 suggest that if 
the ratio between the number of employed and  the number of pensioners is 1.6 in 2030 and 
the compensation rate 60 percent then the contribution rate to old-age and disability pension 
would have to be 37.5 percent of earnings. If the share of employed to pensioners was to 
increase to 2.25 then the contribution rate could drop to 27 percent to give a compensation  3
rate of 60 percent. With the ratio of workers to pensioners equal to 1.6 a contribution rate of 
27 percent would only give a compensation rate of 43 percent. 
 
The old Swedish public pension system was rather sensitive to economic growth. ”With 
acquired rights in the coming twenty years already nearly established, the contribution rate 
required to pay for them was determined almost exclusively by the real rate of growth of the 
contribution base. With real economic growth of 1 percent per year, the contribution rate for 
old-age pension would increase to about 27 percent. On the other hand, real growth of 3 
percent would be sufficient to maintain a constant contribution rate.”
2 At the end of the 1950s 
when the ATP system was constructed a growth rate of 3 percent was not considered high, 
while today even a rate of 2 percent might be optimistic. 
 
Another feature of the ATP system that politicians came to consider a disadvantage was that 
the 15 years and 30 years rules gave an unfair redistributed from blue-collar workers with 
rather flat earnings profiles towards white-collar workers with longer periods of schooling and 
generally higher life-time earnings. This feature jointly with the fact that contributions had to 
be paid also on earnings above the ceiling that limited benefits implied that many workers got 
less in benefits than they contributed. 
 
The rules of the old-age pension system were not independent of those of the disability 
pension and other benefits. Changes in social policy might then also imply changes in the 
pension system and the system was thus susceptible to the political risk of changes. 
 
Finally, the large cohorts of the 1940s were likely to eliminate the accumulated funds in the 
ATP system. To compensate for this reduction in savings a new system that stimulated 
savings was desirable. 
 
3.  A new public pension system 
 
In 1994 Parliament decided about a new pension reform. Persons born prior to 1938 are 
completely outside the new system and those born after 1953 are completely covered. The 
cohorts in between will receive pensions from both the old and the new system. 
 
The new pension system consists of two almost independent parts. One that has been called a 
notional defined contribution pay-as-you-go system (NDC), and one defined contribution 
system (DC). In both systems individual accounts have been set up recording how much each 
individual contributes to each part. The accounts in the NDC system are notional in the sense 
that contributions are not accumulated in funds but used to pay current pensions, while in the 
DC system contributions are invested in the financial markets through registered mutual 
funds. 
 
The contribution rate is 18.5 percent on all earnings below a maximum of about 31000 ecu 
per year
3. There is no contribution if annual earnings does not reach a certain minimum level, 
presently a little more than 900 ecu
4, but if this threshold is passed also earnings below it are 
included in the contribution base. Contributions are split between employees and employers. 
16 percent goes to the NDC system and is noted on the individual’s NDC account and 2.5 
percent goes to the individual’s financial DC account. For the latter contribution the 
                                                 
2 Palmer (forthcoming 2002) 
3 In 2001 this upper threshold was 282750 SEK. It is indexed by the consumer price index. 
4 9963 SEK in 2001.  4
individual can choose to invest in one to five out of some 600 registered funds. These funds 
are independently managed by Swedish and foreign banks, insurance companies and stock 
market brokers. The contributions of those who do not choose funds actively are invested in a 
publicly managed default fund. It is possible to switch funds and there is presently no charge 
for this service. A new government agency, the Premium Pension Authority (PPM), 
administers the interchange between investors and the financial markets. 
 
Accounts in both the NDC and DC schemes grow with: 
 -   New contributions and transfers to the system for non-contributory rights (see below). 
-  A rate of return based on the growth in the average wage rate in the NDC scheme and 
the return on the individual’s fund(s) in the DC system. 
In the NDC system they also grow with inheritance gains from accounts of persons that die 
prior to retirement. These gains are distributed among survivors in the same birth cohort as 
the deceased. In the DC system inheritance gains are accumulated with the surplus of the 
PPM and distributed to pensioners as a surplus rate proportional to each account value. 
 
A full or partial (25%, 50% or 75%) pension can be claimed from the NDC and/or DC 
scheme separately or together at any age from age 61. There is no upper age limit. A benefit 
can be combined with continued work. Contributions paid on earnings from work always 
yield enhanced account values. A person who claims a partial benefit and/or combines a 
benefit with work will have the benefits recalculated, based upon new account values, upon 
permanent retirement. 
 
In the NDC system the annuity is obtained by first dividing the account value by a unisexual 
life expectancy at retirement. Then this ratio is increased by an assumed real annual return of 
1.6 percent and indexed by the CPI. However, if the trend of annual real per capital 
contribution growth deviates from 1.6 percent the annuity is adjusted (up or down) by the 
deviation. In periods of low growth this rule will thus work as a check on the system such that 
the pensions do not increase more (or less) than the earnings of the active generations and that 
of benefits do not exceed contributions. 
 
In the financial DC account system the return on the individually chosen funds will determine 
the annuity. The participants can choose either a fixed or a variable life annuity. In the former 
case the fund shares are sold, and the revenue collectively reinvested by the Premium Pension 




 FVx=B  a(x);      (1) 
 
FVx is the value of the account at the time of retirement of an individual of age x and a(x) a 
longevity adjusted discount factor, 
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where the survival function  ) (x l  is 
                                                 
5 The expressions (1) and (2) are somewhat simplified. The corresponding expressions used in practice take into 
account that the time point when the annuity is computed might precede the time point when the annuity starts, 
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and  ) (x  are age specific death rates. The interest rate  used by the PPM is 3%. If the PPM 
accumulates a profit it will become distributed back to the fund owners and pensioners. The 
annuity B will then be increased by a “surplus rate”. For couples a joint life annuity is offered. 
In this case the survival function above is adjusted accordingly. 
 
When a variable annuity is demanded the pensioner keeps the fund shares and is able to 
reallocate to new funds. A variable annuity is recomputed every year using the same formula 
(1) above as for the fixed annuity, but with the current market value of the fund shares (net of 
withdrawals) and an interest rate of 4%. In this case the pensioner thus chooses to take the 
market risk but also to shift more of the pension payments towards the first half of the 
retirement spell. 
 




The new pension system includes certain non-contributory rights that are part of the social 
insurance system. These include: 
- Child birth credits that are given for a maximum of four years per child, although only 
one credit can be earned at any given time. (Two children born two years apart give 6 
credit years in total.) The credit can be claimed by either parent. Claimants are entitled 
to the most advantageous of 1) contributions based on 75 percent of average earnings 
for all covered persons; 2) contributions based on 80 percent of the individual’s own 
earnings the year prior to child birth; or 3) a supplement consisting of a fixed amount, 
indexed over time to the per capita wage. 
- Credits from periods of sickness, disability and unemployment covered by social 
insurance that are given in both the NDC and the DC schemes. Benefits for sickness 
and unemployment are treated as earnings in computing contributions. An imputation 
of future earnings will be performed for disability. 
- Pension rights generated in compulsory military service in both pension systems. 
- A guarantee benefit that is available from the age of 65. It is an inflation-indexed 
supplement (with a maximum) to the total earnings related benefits from the NDC and DC 
systems. The initial level of the guarantee was set at a high enough gross value to align it 
after-tax with the commensurate benefit in the old system. 
 
All these non-contributory rights are financed by contributions to the NDC and DC 
systems out of general revenues. There are at least two advantages with this way of 
financing these non-contributory rights. First, the pension costs, for instance for sickness 
and unemployment will be charged to the sickness benefit and unemployment benefit 
systems respectively where they belong, and not to the old-age pension system. Second, 
any changes in these social rights can be made without changing the old-age pension 
system, that render it a certain ”political stability”. 
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The NDC system has a buffer fund that arises due to fluctuations in the sizes of birth 
cohorts, but it will also pick up remaining imperfections in the practical design of the 
scheme. The old ATP system had accumulated reserves in year 2000 amounting to 
approximately 25 percent of GDP. These will partially become transferred to the new 
NDC system and help in financing the transition period when the large cohorts of the 
1940s will retire. 
 
Even in the new pension system there are at least two remaining sources of potential 
financial instability. One originates from the way life expectancy is calculated. Rather 
than basing the calculations on cohort-specific projections or allowing for adjustments 
after retirement the architects of the system have chosen to base the estimates on 
contemporaneous survival frequencies for 65 years olds. If the current trend of increasing 
life expectancy continues the pension system will underestimate life expectancy and pay 
too generous pensions. The second source of instability arises because NDC accounts and 
pensions are indexed by the growth in the average wage rate rather than by the growth of 
the contribution base. If the labor force decrease while wages increase the balance 
between contributions paid in and pensions going out could become lost. As a second 
check on the system a balance index has been constructed. It is the ratio of the present 
value of assets to liabilities. When the index falls under unity both account values and 
benefits are deflated by the index. Positive indexation occurs in a recovery until the 
balance index reaches unity again. 
 
The administration of the system is divided between the tax authorities, the National 
Social Insurance Board and the Premium Pension Authority (PPM). The tax authority 
collects contributions. The NDC accounts are kept by the National Social Insurance 
Board. It also pays out NDC, DC and guarantee benefits. The PPM works as a clearing 
house that receives contributions to the DC scheme and invests them in the financial 
markets according to the choices made by the participants. The PPM also keeps track of 
all individual accounts in the DC system. This implies that banks, insurance companies 
and stock market brokers will never see an individual’s investment decisions, all they see 




4.  Recent changes in the negotiated group pensions 
 
During the 1990s the contractual group pension schemes for private sector blue-collar and 
municipal government employees
7 have converted to DC systems following the reform of 
the public system. The contribution rate of the blue-collar group pension is 3 percent of 
earnings and that of the municipal workers extends up to 4.5 percent depending on 
regional arrangements. (Palmer 2000, 2001 and 2002). The result is that over half of the 
Swedish employees are covered by a large mandatory/quasi-mandatory component (the 
DC components of the public and the group pensions), in which participants choose their 
own investment portfolios. As already mentioned the group pension for white-collar 
workers in the private sector is a funded defined benefit system, but it also includes 
elements of individual choice of funds. A new agreement was signed for government 
employees in the beginning of this year. It implies a gradual shift away from an unfunded 
DB system towards a funded DC system. For employees born in 1943, the first cohort to 
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be covered by the new agreement,  the DB component gives almost the whole group 
pension (9.5 percent of earnings) while for those who were born in 1972 it will become 
reduced  to 0.5 percent. The contribution rate to the DC part is 2.3 percent from the age of 
23 and it increases by another 1.9 percent at the age of 28. Thus in the middle of the 2030s 
the group pension for government employees will become of the funded DC type too. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the replacement rates generated jointly by the public pensions and 
group pensions for alternative assumptions of financial return. Given the assumptions as 
explained in the footnote to the table the joint replacement rate at the age of 65 will 
become 54 percent if the real rate of return is 2 percent but 70 percent if the real rate of 
return is 5 percent. 
 
 
5. A closer look at the DC scheme of the public pension: How did people choose? 
 
In the fall of year 2000 the Swedish people got their first opportunity to choose the funds 
they would like to manage their contributions to the DC scheme of the public pension 
system. About 4.4 millions were eligible to choose and they had to choose between 460 
funds, Swedish and foreign. The PPM sent out a catalogue with all registered funds listed 
and with some basic facts about each fund. Mass media was filled with analysis of the 
participating funds. The catalogue also included a form on which each individual could 
state her/his preferences. 
 
67 percent of the eligible made an active choice. Those who did not, about 1.4 millions, 
got their contributions allocated to the default Premium Savings Fund operated by the 
government Seventh AP-Fund. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 shows that women were more active in their choice than men. They also 
on average split their contributions on more funds than men did. Figure 3 shows that those 
who had more money to allocate were more active than those who had less. On average 
people had 1300 ecu to allocate with a minimum of 10 ecu and a maximum of 2700 ecu.
8 
The age pattern displayed in Figure 2 is probably at least partly explained by differences 
in contributions. Young and old had less to allocate. 
 
The maximum number of funds one could choose was 5. Figure 4 shows that a little more 
than 20 percent of all eligible used the maximum number of funds. The first two bars of 
the figure shows the share of women and men that did not choose at all and thus got their 
contributions allocated to the default government operated fund. 
 
As expected, those who had more money to allocate did choose more funds than those 
who had less (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 6 shows how the sum of all contributions from those who made an active choice 
was allocated on type of fund. Almost 35 percent of all contributions was invested in 
funds operating in shares from certain regions, while 15-20 percent were invested in each 
of the funds focusing on Swedish shares, shares in certain industries and in so called 
generation funds. Women had a slight preference for the less risky mixed, generation and 
interest funds. 
                                                 
8 12700, 100 and 26700 kronor respectively.  8
 
There is a rather wide variation in what the funds charge their investors. The typical fund 
would charge 1-1.25 percent annually but there are funds that charge less than 0.24 
percent and more than 1.75 percent. Almost 50 percent of the contributions were allocated 
to funds charging in the range of 0.25-0.49 percent and almost 30 percent to funds in the 
range of 1-1.24 percent. Because women tended to chose less risky funds with lower 
charges they ended up paying less than men on average. 
 
The Swedish “clearing-house” model is rather unique. The tasks of the PPM as a clearing-
house are in summary: 
 
-  to enter into contracts with funds applying to participate in the system, 
-  to execute aggregate purchases vis á vis the participating funds, 
-  to collect and make available information on fund share values on a daily 
basis, 
-  to keep the individual accounts for the system, and 
-  to provide the insurance products specified by law. 
 
The goal of the system architects was to give the contributors as great flexibility as possible in 
choosing among many different funds and in reallocating between funds at a low cost. The 
PPM also gives the investors integrity against the fund managers. Because they do not have 
any information about single investors and their investments they cannot use this information 
in any marketing effort directed to single investors. 
 
The PPM has acted as a powerful buyer of the services of the funds and negotiated the 
administrative charges. In fact all funds that wanted to participate had to sign a contract that 
made the administrative charges much lower than normal. The construction is such that the 
funds will have to give the PPM a rebate. The rebate is computed according to a special 
formula that makes the rebate a function of the funds normal charge and the funds holding 
from the PPM. For instance, a fund with a normal administrative charge of 1.5 percent and 
holdings less than 70 million SEK (a little more than 7 million ecu) would charge 1.225 
percent net of the rebate, while a fund with the same normal charge but holdings of more than 
7000 million SEK (a little more than 700 million ecu) would only charge 0.1752 percent net 
of the rebate. The motivation for this rebate is that the PPM will do some of the services the 
fund managers normally would do, that the funds would only have one big client not several 
thousands and that large investments do not cost much more to administer than small 
investments. 
 
The PPM currently charges the investors 0.3 percent for its services. This service charge 
includes the cost of an annuity. There is not yet any differentiation due to how many times an 
investor reallocates her/his holdings. The motivation is that the first years of operation should 
be seen as a learning period for the participants in the pension system. Less than half of the 
population had any previous experience of investing in funds. 
 
6.  Likely consequences of the reforms 
 
The new pension system is much more viable than the old system. It is likely that it will 
become possible to maintain a contribution rate around 18.5 percent. If economic growth 
increases to a long-run rate of 3 percent or more it is even possible that the contribution rate 
can be reduced. There is however, a price paid by those who retire. At the current rate of   9
growth at about 2 percent the compensation rate becomes lower than most expected to get 
from the old system and if the growth rate becomes lower the compensation rate drops even 
more.
9  The most important change is probably that the risk of decreased growth, low return 
in the financial markets and increased longevity will be carried by the pensioners not by the 
working population. The increased risk to be carried by the pensioners does not only originate 
from the public system but also from the group pensions as explained above, and from the 
increased relative importance of incomes from capital. On the other hand one might hope that 
the “political risk” has decreased. There is though still a latent intergenerational controversy 
that could arise because people have not fully understood how the new system works and still 
have expectations based on the old system. These expectations would not be met if economic 
growth becomes low and if the Swedish society will not be able to provide for the large baby-
boom cohorts. 
 
To increase the growth rate of the Swedish economy it is important to reverse the trend of 
early retirement and make people choose to stay in the labor force beyond the age of 65. The 
new system opens for this possibility and makes any combination of work and retirement 
possible after the age of 61. The maximum pension age of 65 in the group pension contracts 
have been lifted to 67 by legislation in Parliament, and the recent changes in some of these 
contracts towards a DC system might lift this limit even further. 
 
Also the new pension system includes disincentives for increased work for low and high-
income earners. For low-income earners increased work will increase the earnings related 
pension but at the same time decrease the guarantee pension. The gradual decrease of the 
guarantee pension creates a higher marginal effect for low-income earners than for an average 
worker. In the other end of the earnings distribution those who are above the ceiling do not 
earn any additional pension from the public system by working more hours. They might 
though increase their group pension 
 
 One might be rather pessimistic about any increase in the average retirement age because 
leisure is an income elastic commodity and the baby-boom generation is the most wealthy 
generation ever (Klevmarken, 2001). Surveys about people’s retirement plans carried out 
since 1984 show that the share of people with a job in the age bracket 50-64 who wanted to 
retire early increased from 11 percent in 1984 to 20 percent in 1998 (Table 4) and the share of 
people that wanted to reduce work before normal retirement balanced just above 30 percent 
during the whole period. Very few declared in interest in working beyond normal retirement 
age. Admittedly these surveys were done while the old pension system was working and the 
responses might have been influenced by the rules it gave. However, they give such a 
consistent picture of very strong preferences for leisure that it is hard to believe that the new 
pension system will provide sufficiently strong incentives to increase labor supply among the 
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Table 1  The relative importance of different income sources 1992 och 1999 by age. 
 
  Age groups 
  55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84  85- 
Procent  of  gross  income  1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999 1992 1999 
                
Earnings  68,69  69,25 47,35 43,39  7,21 6,23  1,78 1,57 0,47 0,6  0,06 0,15 0,02 0,15 
Business incomes  2,35  1,85 1,35 2,16 1,39 1,07 0,41 0,36 0,14 0,12 0,12 0,67 0,06 0,16 
Income of capital  8,38  11,58  7,06 11,95  11,12  14,05  9,37 15,18 11,39 15,68 11,58 15,29 11,11 13,85 
Disability  pension  8,85  5,87 19,37  12,84  0  0,13  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Partial  pension  0  0  3,04 0,14 0,28 0,13  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Old-age pension  0,01  0  3,03 1,69 66,66  54,99 76,69 65,05 75,65 66,69 73,13  64,7  70,56 61,03 
Group  pensions  1,33  1,7 8,11 14,27 7,28 15,79 6,42 12,02 7,92 11,89 8,17 13,21 3,57  12,57 
Individual pension insurances  0,42  0,63 1,43 2,05 3,08 4,97 2,54 3,02 0,73 1,44 0,62 1,67 0,22 1,43 
Annuities   1,08  0,82 1,7  1,7  0,72 0,52  0,5  0,32 0,32 0,22 0,03 0,16 0,36 0,21 
Family support  0,7  0,86 0,74 0,96 1,39 1,12 2,21 2,36 3,32 3,35 6,27 4,13  13,93  10,52 
Labor market related benefits  1,96  3,29 1,66 5,14 0,1  0,49  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other  positive  transfers  6,23  4,16 5,15 3,7  0,78 0,52 0,07 0,12 0,07 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,18 0,07 
                
Mean  gross  incomes,  1992  SEK 184596 222919 162468 204074 145645 172356 124098 146064 114042 135690  97595  133722  81947  111107 
                
No  of  observations  1817  2087  1684  1802  1299  1505 630 1440 302 1738 162 1155  71  818 
(corresponds  in  the  population)  433282 533151 411316 452880 434134 372151 425755 358592 322708 343754 191914 239324 114108 199265 
Note. People living in institutions are not included in the 1992 sample. The unit of analysis is an individual. Shares and means are weighted by sampling weights. 
Source: Anderssson et.al.(2001)  Data source: HINK/HEK  12
Tabell 2  Labor force participation rates by hours of work, age and gender 1976-
2000.  
(Five years means. The first row shows the share of the labor force that worked 
more than 34 hours per week and the second the share of those who worked 20-
34 hours per week.)  
 
 Males  Females 
Age  1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00
20-24  0,81 0,78 0,79 0,61 0,58 0,75 0,76 0,78 0,62 0,53 
  0,02 0,02 0,03 0,04 0,05 0,13 0,15 0,16 0,14 0,14 
25-34  0,94 0,91 0,91 0,81 0,81 0,75 0,83 0,87 0,78 0,74 
  0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,26 0,32 0,32 0,26 0,21 
35-44  0,96 0,95 0,95 0,88 0,85 0,80 0,87 0,91 0,86 0,82 
  0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,31 0,35 0,37 0,34 0,28 
45-54  0,94 0,93 0,93 0,89 0,86 0,79 0,85 0,89 0,87 0,84 
  0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,29 0,33 0,33 0,29 0,24 
55-59  0,88 0,86 0,85 0,79 0,78 0,65 0,71 0,77 0,75 0,75 
  0,03 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,24 0,29 0,32 0,29 0,26 
60  0,78 0,73 0,73 0,67 0,65 0,52 0,61 0,65 0,64 0,60 
  0,08 0,10 0,12 0,16 0,07 0,21 0,28 0,31 0,31 0,24 
61  0,73 0,69 0,69 0,62 0,58 0,45 0,52 0,56 0,56 0,53 
  0,11 0,14 0,16 0,20 0,11 0,20 0,26 0,28 0,31 0,23 
62  0,69 0,64 0,63 0,56 0,51 0,39 0,47 0,52 0,50 0,47 
  0,12 0,16 0,15 0,20 0,12 0,17 0,23 0,29 0,27 0,21 
63  0,63 0,58 0,56 0,49 0,44 0,30 0,31 0,40 0,38 0,33 
  0,12 0,18 0,16 0,19 0,11 0,12 0,14 0,20 0,21 0,15 
64  0,58 0,53 0,51 0,42 0,37 0,24 0,26 0,31 0,31 0,25 
  0.,09 0.,17 0.,16 0.,17 0.,12 0.,10 0.,12 0.,15 0.,17 0.,12
Source: Andersson et.al. (2001).  Primary source:  Labor Force Surveys, Statistics Sweden.. 
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Table 4.  Desire to stop working before normal pension age 1984-1998;  
               (Percent of 50-64 years old working males and females) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Year  1984 1986 1993 1996 1998 
 
Stop  completely  11.1 12.4 13.4 13.8 20.4 
Work  less  30.5 31.2 34.7 30.6 30.9 
Continue  until  normal  age  53.1 50.3 46.4 48.4 43.1 
Don’t know    5.3    6.1    5.6    7.2    5.7 
 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
No  of  observations  324 477 785 637 583 
Average  age  56.4 56.1 55.7 55.7 55.7 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Figure 1.  Major source of income 1999 for females and males who stopped working  
                1998-1999 
No females                 No of males 
 
  Age                Age 
 
Legend from top to bottom: Disability pension, Sickness benefits/rehabilitation benefits, Unemployment 








Figure 2.  Share of participants that have made an active choice by gender and age 
 
   A g e  





Figure 3.  Share of participants who have made an active choice by gender and 
                 amount contributed 
 
   S E K  
Source: Billberg & Westerberg (2001) 
 
Figure 4. Share among all participants who have chosen 1-5 funds or no fund by gender 
 
 
           No choice    No of mutual funds chosen 
 





Figure 5.  Share of all participants by number of mutual funds chosen 
                 and amount contributed 
 
    Number of mutual funds chosen 
 




Figure 6.  Share of totally contributed sum by type of mutual fund and gender 
 
               Shares -          Shares-           Shares-          Shares            Mixed        Generation       Interest 
               Sweden         Regional        Countries     Industry 
 
Source: Billberg & Westerberg (2001) 